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The last few years have witnessed a significant growth of the experimental and behavioral 
economics research on deviations from purely selfish behavior. Several new theoretical models 
KDYHEHHQGHYHORSHGZKLFKDUHEDVHGRQDPRUHFRPSOH[YLHZRIHFRQRPLFDJHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQV
At the empirical level, many studies have been focused on the context-dependent nature of other-
regarding  behavior.  From  a  socio-economic  point  of  view,  particularly  interesting  is  the 
experimental evidence on the relation between the reduction of the social distance among the 
subjects and the probability of observing deviation from purely selfish choices.  
An original approach to the idea of social distance reduction has been recently proposed by 
Becchetti et al. (2007) and Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009). They study the effects of 
the  reduction  of  the  social  distance  when  the  removal  of  anonymity  is  not  decided  by  the 
experimenters, but it is the consequence of a voluntary choice made by the subjects themselves. 
They run two experiments based on two well-known games: the Investment Game (Becchetti et 
DODQGWKH7UDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPD%HFFKHWWL'HJOL$QWRQLDQG)DLOOR7KHUHVXOWVRI
these experiments turned out to be very interesting, even because they could not be accounted for 
by appealing the ³VWDQGDUG´ explanations of the effect of the reduction of social distance. In this 
SDSHUZHJREDFNWRWKH%HFFKHWWL¶VHWDODQG%HFFKHWWL'HJOL$QWRQLDQG)DLOOR¶V
results, and we show that it is possible to give an interpretation of this kind of evidence by 
referring to the concept of relational goods (Uhlaner 1989; Gui 2000, 2002). 
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disclaimer applies. 1.  Introduction 
The last few  years have witnessed a dramatic growth of the experimental and behavioral 
economics research on deviations from purely selfish behavior. Several new theoretical models 
have been GHYHORSHGZKLFKDUHEDVHGRQDPRUHFRPSOH[YLHZRIHFRQRPLFDJHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQV 
At the empirical level, many studies have been focused on the context-dependent nature of other-
regarding  behavior.  From  a  socio-economic  point  of  view,  particularly  interesting  is  the 
experimental evidence on the relation between the reduction of the social distance among the 
subjects and the probability of observing deviation from purely selfish choices. Social distance 
has been manipulated by introducing impersonal communication (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
1998),  face  to  face  interaction  (Bohnet  and  Frey  1999b,  Rankin,  2006),  silent  identification 
(Bohnet  and  Frey  1999a  and  1999b,  Scharlemann  et  al.  2001),  information  about  personal 
characteristics (Bohnet and Frey 1999b, Charness, Haruvy and Sonsino, 2007) and by varying 
the degree of anonymity (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996) between subjects.
1 What emerges 
from  these  studies  is  a  positive  and  significant  correlation  between  the  reduction  of  social 
distance and the frequency of no-selfish and cooperative choices. Two explanations have been 
offered to account for this evidence. According to some authors, the reduction of the social 
distance promotes the emergence of a feeling of empathy among subjects, which results in higher 
levels of cooperation (Bohnet and Frey 1999a). A second explanation is based on the idea that 
³WKHµIUDPLQJ¶RIWKHGHFLVLRQFDQLQIOXHQFHH[SHFWDWLRQVE\DVVRFLDWLQJDVXEMHFW¶VGHFLVLRQZLWK
SDVW H[SHULHQFH´ +RIIPDQ 0F&DEH DQG 6PLWK   DQG PRUH LQ JHQHUDO ZLWK KHU
everyday  social  life.  In  particular,  the  reduction  of  the  social  distance  would  increase  the 
subjects¶ concern for the social consequences of  their decisions, and this would results in a 
higher probability of adopting in the laboratory the same rules which drive their everyday social 
interactions. 
Becchetti et al. (2007) and Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) proposed a different 
approach to the study of the effects of the reduction of the social distance in which the removal 
of anonymity is not decided by the experimenters, but it is the consequence of a voluntary choice 
made by the subjects themselves. They run two experiments based on two well-known games: 
the  Investment  Game  (Becchetti  et  al.,2007)  and  the  TravelHU¶V Dilemma  (Becchetti,  Degli 
Antoni and Faillo, 2009). The results of these experiments turned out to be very interesting, even 
because they could not be accounted for by appealing neither to the Bohnet and Frey¶V (1999a) 
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1 The reduction of social distance was considered for example in public good games (Bohnet and Frey 1999a), 
dictator  games  (Hoffman,  McCabe  and  Smith   %RKQHW DQG )UH\ D DQG E SULVRQHU¶V GLOHPPDV
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998) and trust games (Scharlemann et al. 2001). nor to the Hoffman, McCabHDQG6PLWK¶V (1996) explanations discussed above. In this paper we 
go back to the Becchetti¶V et al. (2007) and Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo¶V (2009) results, 
and we show that it is possible to give an interpretation of this kind of evidence by referring to 
the concept of relational goods (Uhlaner 1989; Gui 2000, 2002). 
The paper is divided in six sections. In the second section we provide a short survey of the 
literature on relational goods. In the third section we describe the experimental design of the two 
experiments presented in Becchetti et al. (2007) and Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) 
(hereafter also B2007 and B2009). In the fourth section we discuss the hypotheses on the effect 
RIUHODWLRQDOJRRGVRQSOD\HUV¶EHKDYLRXULQWKHWZRH[SHULPHQWV,QWKHILIWh section we discuss 
the main findings. The sixth section concludes. 
2.  The Concept of Relational Goods 
Over the last few years, economic analysis has devoted more and more attention to the role of 
factors connected with interpersonal relations. One of the main attempts that economists have 
made in order to improve their understanding of them is linked to the concept of relational goods 
(Gui 1987, Uhlaner 1989). 5HODWLRQDOJRRGV³GHSHQGXSRQLQWHUDFWLRQVDPRQJSHUVRQV´8Klaner 
1989, p. 253) and are peculiar intangible outputs of an affective and communicative nature (Gui 
2000)  that  are  produced  through  social  interactions.  In  particular,  Gui  (2002)  proposes  to 
consider  every  form  of  interaction  as  a  particular  productive  process  that  the  author  calls 
³encounter´. Relational goods may be generated in an encounter, but they are not the encounter 
in  itself,  which  can  generate  many  other  different  outputs
2  (Gui  2000,  p.155).  Examples  of 
relational goods are: social approval, friendship and its benefit, the desire to be recognized or 
DFFHSWHGE\RWKHUVEXWDOVRWKH³DWPRVSKHUH´WKDWLVFUHDWHGDPRQJZDLWLQJFXVWRPHUVLQDKDLU
GUHVVHU¶VVKop, or a conversation concerning non-professional matters occurring during breaks in 
DEXVLQHVVPHHWLQJ´*XLS%\ORRNLQJDWWKHVHH[DPSOHVLWLVFOHDUWKDWrelational 
goods  can  be  either  an  asset,  like  a  friendship,  or  else  a  one-shot  consumer  good  like  the 
³DWPRVSKHUH´ WKDW LV FUHDWHG DPRQJ ZDLWLQJ FXVWRPHUV LQ D KDLU GUHVVHU¶V VKRS  or,  more  in 
JHQHUDOWKHUHODWLRQDOJRRGVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH³ZHOO-EHLQJ´RU³EDG-EHLQJ´SURGXFHGE\D
conversation with other people (Bruni and Stanca 2008). 
Relational  goods  have  three  main  characteristics.  First,  they  are  a  subset  of  local  public 
goods,  since  they  are  non  rival  and  non  exclusive  but  only  with  regard  to  the  people  who 
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2 Examples of outputs which are accounted for by standard economic concepts and which are produced during an 
encounter are: the reallocation of goods of people involved in the interaction (e.g a buyer and a seller) and the 
provision of a service (e.g in case of a legal advice) (Gui 2000). SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHLUSURGXFWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR8KODQHU³5HODWLRQDOJRRGVFan only be enjoyed 
with some others. They are thus unlike private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and standard 
SXEOLFJRRGVZKLFKFDQEHHQMR\HGE\DQ\QXPEHU´ (Uhlaner 1989, p.254). The consumption of 
relational goods is contextual and simultaneous to their production, since they can not be enjoyed 
alone, but only through interpersonal relations with other people (Sacco and Vanin 2000; Bruni 
and Stanca, 2008). They can be actually considered anti-rival since the joint fruition is essential 
to their value. Second, contributions to their production depend on mutual agreement (Uhlaner 
1989).  Goodwill  is  important  for  their  production,  they  can  not  be  imposed.  Even  though 
relational goods may be generated through encounters which happen in different environments, 
some  circumstances  seem  more  convenient  than  others.  In  particular,  relations  that  are  not 
constrained  but  that  people  voluntarily  decide  to  start,  such  as  relations  inside  volunteering 
associations, are more likely to generate relational goods (Prouteau and Wolff, 2004). Relational 
goods also ³acquire value through sincerity or genuineness ±which is impossible to buy, so they 
can be generated as a by product of some instrumental activity but not by making contracts for 
their  suppl\´ %HFFKHWWL 3HOORQL,  Rossetti  2008,  p.346).  Third,  their  value  depends  on  the 
characteristics of people sharing the goods (Sacco and Vanin 2000) and is increased by fellow 
feeling.
3 With this respect, one could prefer to share time with people she trusts or she finds 
friendl\)RUWKLVUHDVRQWKHH[SHFWHGYDOXHRIUHODWLRQDOJRRGV¶FRQVXPSWLRQGHSHQGVRQWKH
disposition that agents have on the personal characteristics of people they are going to meet. A 
good disposition increases the probability that agents enjoy the encounter and, consequently, the 
quality of the relational good produced (and consumed) by it. On the contrary, feelings such as 
rancour or envy can interfere with their production (and, consequently, with their consumption). 
Therefore, it is clear that some circumstances can promote better than other their creation.  
Until now relational goods have been mostly considered to explain social behaviour such as 
political participation (Uhlaner 1989) or associational membership (Prouteau and Wolff 2004). 
Our analysis opens a new interesting field by experimentally testing whether the possibility of 
consuming  relational  goods  has  a  direct  impact  also  on  variables  such  as  trust  and 
trustworthiness that are key elements for socio-economic development. In the next pages we will 
report the results of two experiments aimed at studying the impact of voluntary reduction of 
social distance on trust, trustworthiness and cooperation and we will present an interpretation of 
the evidence in terms of relational goods. 
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3 The fellow feeling hypothesis of Adam Smith has been recently re-elaborated by Sugden (2002) arguing that the 
LQWHQVLW\RIFRPPRQFRQVHQWDQG³WKHFRQVHTXHQWUHPRYDORIXQHDVHDQGGLVVRQDQFHFDXVHGE\SHUFHSWLRQRI
GLVSDULWLHVLQVHQWLPHQWV´LVDVRXUFHRISOHDVXUHLQUHODWLRQDODFWLYLWLHV 3.  Two Experiments on the Voluntary Reduction of Social Distance. 
The experiment run by Becchetti et al. (2007) is based on a two-player Investment Game 
(Berg,  Dickhaut  and  McCabe,  1995)  in  which  both  players  are  endowed  with  10  tokens  (1 
token=0,50 euros). The first mover, the Trustor, must decide how much of her endowment to 
send to the second mover, the Trustee. The amount sent is tripled and delivered to the Trustee, 
who must decide how much of the tripled sum to send back to the Trustor. Note that assuming 
rational  and  selfish  individuals,  the  sub-game  perfect  Nash  equilibrium  of  this  game  is  the 
VWUDWHJ\YHFWRULQZKLFKWKH7UXVWHHVHQGV]HURZKDWHYHUWKH7UXVWRU¶VWUDQVIHUDQGWKH7UXVWRU
VHQGV]HURDQWLFLSDWLQJWKH7UXVWHH¶VFKRLFH 
The Investment Game is particularly useful for detecting the willingness to cooperate. In this 
context, we say that an agent behaves in a cooperative way if she does not play only in order to 
maximize her monetary payoff. A Trustor plays in a cooperative way if she is interested in the 
total  payoff  which  may  be  generated  in  the  game  and  exposes  itself  to  the  risk  of  other 
opportunism. A Trustee is cooperative as far as she decides not to keep all the amount sent by the 
Trustor and send back a positive amount.
4 
The experimental literature on the Investment Game shows that Trustors send on average 
about 50% of their endowment, and Trustees repay by sending back between 95 and 110% of the 
amount sent by Trustors. Hence, the return to D³trustIXOEHKDYLRXU´ tend to be zero (Berg et al. 
1995; Camerer, 2003;Camerer and Fehr, 2004).  
In  the  B2007  experiment  subjects  played  the  Investment  Game  under  two  different 
treatments:  the  Baseline  Treatment  and  the  Encounter  Treatment.  In  the  Baseline  Treatment 
subjects played a standard Investment Game under full anonymity, while subjects participating 
in  the  Encounter  Treatment  had  the  possibility  to  decide  whether  to  remove  anonymity  by 
encountering,  at  the  end  of  the  experiment,  their  counterpart.  In  particular,  in  this  second 
treatment,  subjects  were  first  instructed  about  the  rules  of  the  Investment  Game,  then  they 
decided whether to opt or not for the encounter, they signed in, they discovered their role and 
they played the game. Before playing the game they were aware of the fact that the meeting 
would take place only if both players decided to opt for the encounter and they were informed on 
WKHLURSSRQHQWV¶FKRLFHDERXWWKHHQFRXQWHURQO\DWWKHHQGRIWKHH[SHULPHQW. The subjects 
H[SUHVVHGWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVVWRRSWIRUWKHHQFRXQWHUE\UHSO\LQJZLWKD³<HV´WRWKHIROORZLQJ
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4 :LWKUHVSHFWWRWKH7UDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPDZKLFK will be introduced later, a cooperative behavior entails that players 
do not try to obtain the reward (and consequently try to avoid that the sanction against the other player arises). ZULWWHQTXHVWLRQ³Do you want to meet, at the end of the experiment, the person you are paired 
ZLWK"´. At the end of the experiment, and before leaving the room, members of the pairs in 
which both the subjects opted for the encounter were introduced to each other. The meeting did 
not involve any post-play activity. 
In both the treatments, the game was one-shot, and the experiment finished just after the 
VXEMHFWV¶FKRLFH(DFKVXEMHFWSDUWLFLSDWHGRQO\LQRQHRIWKHWZRWUHDWPHQWV 16 sessions for 
have been conducted in three Italian universities (Trento, Milano-Bicocca, and Forlì). A
 total of 
368 subjects participated in the experiment.  
The primary objective of the authors was to assess whether the introduction of the choice to 
remove anonymity have a significant impact on the level of cooperation (in terms of reciprocal 
contributions). As we will see in the fifth section, the results seem to confirm the existence of 
this kind of effect. 
In order to check for the robustness of this result Becchetti Degli Antoni and Faillo2009 run a 
second experiment, with a design similar to that of B2007, but based on a 7UDYHOHU¶VDilemma 
(Basu,  1994).  The  game  owes  its  name  to  the  example  used  to  illustrate  it.  Two  travelers 
returning from a remote island lose their luggage because of the airline company. In order to be 
reimbursed for the same souvenir contained in the luggage, they have to write down on a piece 
of paper the value of the souvenir which may range between 2 and 100 (in the original Basu 
1994 paper). If the travelers write a different number, they are reimbursed with the minimum 
amount declared. Moreover, a penalty equal to 2 is paid to the traveler who declares the higher 
value, while a reward of the same amount is paid by the traveler who writes the lower value. If 
the two claims are the same, the two travelers receive the declared value without reward or 
penalty. Considering the characteristics of the game, if both of travelers want to maximize their 
monetary payoffs, the (2,2) outcome is the only Nash equilibrium of the game, independently of 
the size of the penalty or reward (hereafter also P/R). 
The 7UDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPD has been introduced as an example of strategic interaction in which 
the Nash solution appears as far less plausible than the strategy profile in which each player 
declares  a  large  number,  believing  that  the  other  does  the  same  (Basu,  1994).  It  has  been 
observed  that  the  size  of  the  punishment  (reward)  has  a  key  role  in  emergence  of  Nash 
equilibrium, both in the one-shot and in the repeated version of the game (Goeree and Holt, 
2001; Capra et al. 1999). In particular, aQLPSRUWDQWFRQFOXVLRQLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLVWKDW³WKH1DVK
equilibrium provides good predictions for high incentives (R = 80 and R = 50, when the possible 
choice ranges between 80 and 200) but behavior is quite different from the Nash prediction XQGHUWKHWUHDWPHQWVZLWKORZDQGLQWHUPHGLDWHYDOXHVRI5´&DSUDHWDOSThe 
scarce predictive capacity of the Nash equilibrium is confirmed by Rubinstein (2007) showing 
that around 50 percent of more than 4.500 subjects who played the TravelHU¶V'LOHPPDonline 
opted for the maximum choice (the minimum and maximum choice allowed were 180$ and 300$ 
respectively and P|R was 5$).
5 Rubinstein, by using response time data, concludes that in his 
experiment declaring 300$ (the largest number) can be interpreted as an instinctive (emotional) 
choice,  while  choices  in  the  range  255-299  appear  as  the  ones  which  imply  the  strongest 
cognitive effort. 
The B2009 study was based on a one-shot TUDYHOHU¶VDilemma with minimum choice 20 and 
maximum choice 200, and punishment/reward equal to 20. The experiment consisted of three 
treatments: Baseline Treatment (BT), Compulsory Encounter Treatment (CET) and Voluntary 
Encounter Treatment (VET), with subjects participating only in one treatment. In the BT subjects 
SOD\WKHEDVLF7UDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPDIn the CET, before playing the game, subjects are informed 
that they would meet their counterpart at the end of the experiment. The VET differs from the 
CET because (as in the B2007 experiment) in the former the meeting is a voluntary choice of the 
players (the willingness to meet their counterparts was collected by means of the same procedure 
adopted  in  the  B2007  experiment).  The  introduction  of  the  treatment  with  the  compulsory 
meeting allowed the authors to distinguish between the effects of social distance associated with 
empathy and framing discussed in the introduction (which can be observed in the CET) and the 
preferences for the production and the consumption of a relational good (which can be observed 
only in the VET). 
,QDOOWKHWUHDWPHQWVDWWKHHQGRIWKHJDPHEHOLHIVDERXWWKHRSSRQHQW¶VFKRLFHwere elicited 
by asking each subject to guess the number chosen by her opponent and paying her 1 euro if the 
GLVWDQFHEHWZHHQKHUJXHVVDQGWKHLURSSRQHQW¶VDFWXDOFKRLFHwas less then 10
6. In both the 
B2007  and  the  B2009  experiments,  some  socio-demographic  and  attitudinal  data  have  been 
collected by means of a questionnaire. As we will show in the following pages, some of these 
data turned out to be very helpful for the interpretation of the evidence.  
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5 Note that subjects who participated in the online experiment were not paid. Rubinstein stresses that the distribution 
of answers of his experiment is similar to that of Goeree and Holt (2001) when they use the low P|R. 
6 The author decided to adopt this rule because , in this  kind of experiment, a prize exclusively given to the correct 
guess could be considered too difficult to achieve, and can discourage players and increase the likelihood of casual 
answers. At the same time,eliciting procedures based on quadratic scoring rules (Davis and Holt 1993) are useless 
for a game - OLNHRXUYHUVLRQRIWKH7UDYHOOHU¶V'LOHPPD- characterized by a large number of possible strategies. 
7KHXVHRIWROHUDQFHWKUHVKROGVIRUVXEMHFWV¶JXHVVHVLVXVHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDVDYDOLGPHWKRGIRUHOLWLFLQJEHOLHIV
(see for example Charness and Dufwemberg 2006; Croson 2000). The experiment was conducted in two Italian universities (Milano and Forlì) with 2 sessions 
for the BT, 2 sessions for the CET and 3 sessions for the VET. A total of 140 undergraduate 
students participated in the experiment. 
 
4.  The  Role  of  Relational  Goods  in  Increasing  Cooperation  when  the  Reduction  of 
Social Distance is a Voluntary Choice of Players 
The novelty of B2007 and B2009 experiments is the introduction of a voluntary option to 
PHHW WKH FRXQWHUSDUW DIWHU KDYLQJ SOD\HG DQ ,QYHVWPHQW *DPH DQG D 7UDYHOHU¶V 'LOHPPD
respectively.  It  generates  the  possibility  to  consume  relational  goods  through  a  personal 
encounter that agents will share after having interacted in the laboratory.  
Even if experimental results on Ultimatum games (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, 
Camerer and Thaler 1995), Dictator Games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), Gift Exchange Games 
(Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 1993, Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter 1998), Investment 
Games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995, Ben-Ner e Putterman 2006) and Public Good Games 
(Fischbacher,  Gächter  and  Fehr  2001,  Sonnemans,  Schram  and  Offerman  1999,  Fehr  and 
Gächter 2000) have widely stressed that human behaviour is also strongly motivated by the 
consideration of others (i.e., for example, by fairness, reciprocity and inequity aversion), we are 
not aware of previous experimental studies that introduce the possibility of consuming relational 
goods in order to analyse their impact on cooperation.  
According to our interpretation (see also the original papers to a more detailed explanation 
related to the two single experiments) agents who took part in the experiments carried out by 
Becchetti et al (2007) and Becchetti Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) may opt for the encounter in 
the two games for three main reasons: 1) curiosity; 2) desire to meet the counterpart in order to 
negatively reciprocate if she behaves opportunistically in the game; 3) desire to have a good time 
with the counterpart (i.e. desire to consume relational goods). Note that, if we assume nonzero 
opportunity cost of time, the decision to meet the counterpart at the end of the game reveals a 
positive utility which player may associate to one (or more) of these three different motivations 
for the meeting.  
By focussing on these three motivations, B2009 show that only when the third motivation is 
present a significant difference between the behaviour of players who voluntarily opt for the 
meeting and other agents emerges. In fact, B2009 present an empirical test (see next section) 
which disentangles between the first two motivations (curiosity and negative reciprocity) and the 
third one (relational goods) and show that the desire to consume relational goods is a necessary condition to observe departure from individual rationality in the strategies of players who opt for 
the meeting.  
Moreover, the  more  cooperative  attitude of players  who opt  for the meeting  both  in  the 
Investment  GaPH DQG LQ WKH 7UDYHOHU¶V 'LOHPPD PD\ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV WKH ZLOOLQJQHVV WR
increase the probability to consume relational goods during the meeting. Since the production 
and the consumption of relational goods depends on the disposition of people who meet (section 
2), players who opt for the meeting are more cooperative EHFDXVHRIWKHHIIHFWWKDWJDPH¶VUHVXOW
KDYH RQ WKH FRXQWHUSDUW¶V GLVSRVLWLRQ 7UXVWRUV 7UXVWHHV DQG WKH WZR ³7UDYHOHUV´ RI  the 
Traveler¶s Dilemma know that disposition of their counterpart towards them is affected by their 
behaviour in the game. A trustful contribution by the Trustor reveals the willingness to create a 
cooperative  relation  with  the  Trustee  and  creates  positive  conditions  for  the  production  of 
relational goods after the game. On the social and economic point of view such contribution 
entails  a  monetary  risk  for  the  Trustor  which  may  be  traded  off  by  nonmaterial  benefits 
generated by the relational good consumed during the encounter. The Trustee can, in turn, affect 
the disposition of the Trustor by showing herself trustworthy (i.e. by sending back to the Trustor 
D³IDLU´DPRXQW7KHWUDGH-RIIEHWZHHQJLYLQJDZD\PRQHWDU\EHQHILWVWR³SD\´QRQPDWHULDO
gains applies also to her. Disposition of the two players in the Traveller¶s Dilemma will be 
affected by the payment (or by the win) of the penalty (of the reward).  
Trustors, Trustees DQGSOD\HUVLQWKH7UDYHOOHU¶V'LOHPPDwho voluntarily decide to meet the 
counterpart after the game could decide to be relatively more cooperative in the game in order to 
increase the expected value of the relational goods they have the possibility to produce through 
the encounter. 
An important qualification, relevant to the experiments used in B2007 and B2009, is that the 
concept of relational good may vary from a minimum to a maximum content. The minimum 
content is just the desire to avoid the hostility of the counterpart. The maximum content may be, 
for example, the hope to begin a cooperative relation with the other player starting from the 
small joint experience lived during the game. We may just observe in the experiment whether 
contributions grow when the opportunity of the encounter is chosen, but we cannot discriminate 
whether  the  players  do  it  by  having  in  mind  the  minimum  or  the  maximum  content  of  the 
relational good.  
Finally, note that, if a subject decides not to meet her counterpart, she will play a standard 
anonymous game. According to the role of goodwill in the creation of relational goods (section 2),  the  voluntary  character  of  the  encounter  should  create  (if  supported  by  the  suitable 
dispositions) a favourable environment for the relational goods to arise in the meeting. 
 
5.  Social Distance, Relational  Goods and  Cooperation: Evidence from the Investment 
Game and the TUDYHOHU¶VDilemma 
This section resumes the main results reported in B2007 and B2009 and proposes a discussion 
of these results in the light of the concept of relational goods. The hypothesis behind this analysis 
is  that the possibility to create and consume  relational goods  through the meeting increases 
cooperative behaviour by players who have preferences for relational goods.  
Evidence seems to indicate a significantly difference LQDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRXUZKHQWKHPHHWLQJ
option is introduced and chosen. With this respect, three points must be stressed. 
 
1.  In the investment game:  
a.  Trustors who opt for the meeting follow  a behavior  consistent with Nash  equilibrium 
when  players  have  standard  self-interested  preferences  based  only  on  monetary 
arguments (that is, sending no money to the Trustee, which we define from now on as 
standard (textbook) behavior) significantly  less  than  Trustors who do not opt  for  the 
meeting;  
b.  the average contribution of Trustors is significantly larger when the meeting option is 
available than when it is not available. Moreover, when we restrict the analysis within 
the sample of the 93 Trustors who are given the opportunity to opt for the encounter, the 
average contribution of those who opt is significantly higher than that of those who do 
not opt. 
The share of Trustors who send no money to the Trustee is 11.41 on the overall sample of 184 
observations. It rises to 19.78 percent in the 91 cases in which the opportunity of the encounter is 
not available and falls sharply to 3.22 percent when the opportunity is offered (93 observations). 
Within this subsample the share is slightly higher for Trustors who do not opt (4.17 percent on 
48 cases) and slightly smaller for those who opt for the encounter (2.22 percent with 45 cases)
7.  
Hence, the opportunity of consuming a relational good has significant effects on the deviation 
from the standard behavior. This finding shows that, with a slight departure from an aseptic 
context  with  no  possibility  of  creating  relational  goods,  benchmark  concepts,  such  as  Nash 
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7 ,QUHODWLRQWRWKH7UXVWRUV¶GHFLVLRQZKHQWKHPHHWLQJLVDYDLODEOHLQWKH,QYHVWPHQW*DPHZHREVHUYHWKDWRXW
of 93 subjects opted for the meeting. equilibria  under  the  assumption  of  self-interested  players,  become  less  and  less  adequate  to 
GHVFULEHDJHQWV¶FKRLFHV2QDQRWKHUSHUVSHFWLYHZHPD\DVZHOOLQWHUSUHWthis finding by arguing 
that absence of relational opportunities reduces the capacity to create trust and trustworthiness 
and the productivity gains which may arise from cooperation.  
7KH FRPSDULVRQ RI WKH DYHUDJH 7UXVWRU¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ XQGHU the  two  different  treatments 
(when the option of meeting the Trustee is available or not) yields results consistent with those 
commented above. The average contribution is significantly larger when the option is available 
(5.16 tokens) than when it is not (3.78 tokens) and the difference in means is significant at 95 
percent.
8 This implies that the simple availability of the opportunity of the encounter raises on 
average the Trustor contribution, independently from her decision to meet the counterpart. It may 
be argued that the result is determined by the expected larger contribution of those who actually 
opt for the possibility of the encounter when the option is available. However, this does not seem 
to explain the entire story since the mean contribution of those who have the opportunity but do 
not opt for the encounter is still higher (4.37 tokens) than that of those who are devoid of such 
opportunity  (3.78  tokens).  An  interpretation  for  this  finding  may  be  that  part  of  the  higher 
contribution of the sender in presence of the opportunity to opt for the encounter is independent 
from  WKH 7UXVWRU¶V GHFLVLRQ WR RSW IRU LW DQG KDV D strategic  component,  represented  by  the 
anticipation that the Trustee may be willing to pay back more if she opts for the encounter. 
Consider, however, that the difference between those who have the possibility to opt and do not 
and those who are not given such opportunity is only weakly significant both with parametric 
and non parametric tests (77 percent significance). When we restrict our descriptive analysis 
within the sample of the 93 Trustors who are given the opportunity to opt for the encounter, we 
observe that the average contribution of those who opt (6.82 tokens) is significantly higher than 
that of those who do not opt (4.37 tokens).
9 It seems that the opportunity to meet the counterpart 
generates  a  significant  effect  on  the  decision  to  send  by  Trustors  which  cannot  be  simply 
explained by a selection bias effect. 
Given the standard assumption that the amount given by the Trustor is tripled, our finding 
implies that, on average, the µaggregate gain¶ generated by the option of the encounter - i.e. the 
extra amount of tokens generated by it - is 15.48-11.40 = 4.08 tokens or a 42.1 per cent increase 
with respect to the benchmark in which the relational good is not available. 
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8  6LQFH WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI 7UXVWRU¶V FRQWULEXWLRQV GHSDUWV IURP QRUPDOLW\ ZH DOVR FRQVLGHU QRQ SDUDPHWULF
diagnostics and find that the significance is confirmed by Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test=  -2.940 Prob > 
|z| = 0.003. 
9 The significance is confirmed by the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test: test= -2.451 Prob > 
|z| = 0.014). 2.  In the investment game, the amount sent back by Trustees and the number of Trustees who 
do  not  behave  according  to  the  standard  economic  behavior  (i.e.  who  do  not  send  back 
anything) is significantly higher when the option of the meeting is selected.  
The dependent variable chosen to study TUXVWHHV¶EHKDYLRUis the share of the amount paid 
back on the total amount received. The share of Trustees behaving consistently with the standard 
behavior is higher for Trustees than for Trustors (26.38 percent on the overall sample against 
11.41 among Trustors) (Table 2). 
 
Table.2  'HVFULSWLYH VWDWLVWLFV RQ WKH 7UXVWHH¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ XQGHU different  experiment 
designs (Total sample) 
Sharerest 









Encounter option available 
  
7UXVWHH¶VGHFLVLRQWRRSWIRUWKHHQFRXQWHU 






0  26.38  26.03  26.67  16.67  33.33 
0 < sharerest   0.1  7.98  8.22  7.78  8.33  7.41 
0.1< sharerest  0.2  16.56  20.55  13.33  8.33  16.67 
0.2< sharerest  0.3  3.07  5.48  1.11  0.00  1.85 
0.3< sharerest  0.4  21.47  19.18  23.33  25.00  22.22 
0.4< sharerest  0.5  7.98  6.85  8.89  11.11  7.41 
0.5< sharerest  0.6  4.29  2.74  5.56  11.11  1.85 
0.6< sharerest  0.7  7.98  5.48  10.00  13.89  7.41 
0.7< sharerest  0.8  1.84  0.00  3.33  5.56  1.85 
0.8< sharerest  0.9  0.61  1.37  0.00  0.00  0 
0.9< sharerest  1  1.84  4.11  0.00  0.00  0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Percent values. Source: Becchetti et al. 2007. 
This is reasonable if we assume that the Trustee, differently from the Trustor, has no strategic 
reasons  (such  as  the  hope  to  stimulate  the  contribution  of  the  Trustee)  to  deviate  from  the 
standard behavior. Another striking difference is that most of the variability is not explained just 
by the opportunity of the encounter (conformity to the ³standard behavioU´ is even higher for 
those who are given the opportunity of the encounter but do not opt (33.33 percent) than for 
those who are not given the opportunity) but by the actual choice of opting for the encounter (in 
such case the share of individuals which follows ³standard behavioU´ drops to 16.67 percent). Our interpretation is that the receiver has no expected additional gains from the possibility that, 
even though she does not opt for the encounter, the other player does. Hence there is no point to 
her in giving more when the option is available but she does not want to meet the Trustor. This 
interpretation  is  also  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  opportunity  of  the  encounter  has  no 
significant effects on the average share paid back
10. 
When  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  the  subsample  of  the  90
11  individuals  who  have  the 
opportunity to opt for the encounter we find that the amount sent back is significantly higher (it 
almost doubles) when the Trustee opts for the encounter (around 35 percent for those who opt 
DJDLQVWDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKRVHZKRGRQ¶W6LQFHWKHGLVWribution of the dependent variable is 
definitely  not  normal,  we  use  non  parametric  test  to  evaluate  whether  this  difference  is 
significant and find that it is.
 12 
 
3  In the TravelHU¶VDilemma agents who voluntarily decide to meet the counterpart are more 
likely to have a choice which is higher or equal than their belief  (in this way trying to avoid 
that a sanction against the other player arises) 
The comparison between choicHDQGEHOLHILQWKH7UDYHOHU¶VDilemma gives us important 
insights into the effect of SUHIHUHQFHVIRUUHODWLRQDOJRRGVDQGDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUIf we look at 
the distribution of the difference between choice and belief we find that only 18 percent of 
players choose one unit below the belief, while around 11 percent of them are such that C>B+10  
Notice that iISOD\HUV¶EHOLHILVFRUUHFWO\H[SUHVVHGDQGZHGRQRWKDYHUHDVRQWRGRXEWDERXW
it) agents who chose a number higher than their belief + 10, voluntarily decide to incur in the 
WUDYHOHU¶VJDPHSHQDOW\ With this respect, we find that the percentage of agents who declare a 
number higher than their belief + 10 is equal to 17% in the voluntary encounter treatment, it is 
equal to 7.5% in the baseline treatment and it is equal to 7.5% in the compulsory encounter 
treatment. More specifically, 21% of subjects who opted for the meeting declared a number 
higher than their belief + 10 while this percentage drops to 12.5% among people who did not opt 
for the meeting. If we look at the difference between choice and belief, we find that agents who 
want to meet their counterpart in the voluntary meeting treatment have on average a choice 
which is 6.89 points higher than their belief. This is a remarkable result considering that, as we 
expect,  all  the  other  subgroup  means  are  negative  (the  choice  is  below  the  belief).  More 
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10 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z = -0.802 Prob > |z| =  0.422. 
11 The sample is slightly smaller than the corresponding one among Trustors since Trustees receiving zero amounts 
are obviously dropped from the sample. 
12 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z = -2.703Prob > |z| =  0.007. specifically, all the rest of the sample has a -5.40 average, the baseline group -5.85 and the 
compulsory treatment group -2.77. Differences between choice and belief are not statistically 
significant with respect to the different subsamples. However, it does not undermine the idea that 
the willingness to consume relational goods reduces opportunistic behavior. In fact, Becchetti, 
Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) consider a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if players 
choose a number higher than their belief minus 1. We may consider these agents as cooperative 
(or  non  opportunistic)  agents  in  the  sense  that  they  want  to  reduce  the  probability  that  the 
counterpart has to pay the penalty in the game. Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) show 
that the probability to observe this kind of behavior is significantly higher when players opt for 
the meeting and, at the same time, they declare a level of generalized trust above median.
13 The 
role of generalized trust is very important for the interpretation of the increase of cooperative 
behavior in terms of willingness to consume relational goods (and to rule out the alternative 
hypotheses which are usually considered by the literature on social distance reduction). In fact, 
tKH DXWKRUV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV WKDW JHQHUDOL]HG WUXVW LQFRUSRUDWHV SOD\HU¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RQ WKH
counterpart  in  terms  of  social  orientation.  In  particular,  generalized  trust  in  others  would 
DSSUR[LPDWHSOD\HUV¶WUXVWWKDWWKHFRXQWHUSDUWLVDVRFLDORULHQWHGVXEMHFW. Only agents who trust 
that their counterpart will be socially oriented (i.e. disposed to produce and consume relational 
goods) will avoid opportunistic behavior in order to generate an agreeable atmosphere in the 
meeting. In other words, it is only when players who opt for the meeting have high level of 
generalize trust that we may reasonably assume that their meeting decision is due to the desire to 
consume relational goods.
 14 In case players opt for the meeting without having high generalized 
trust we assume that their decision to meet the counterpart is driven by the other two motivations 
(curiosity or negative reciprocity).  
These different hypotheses on the reason behind the decision to opt for the meeting (i.e. 
willingness to consume relational goods, curiosity and negative reciprocity) are tested in B2009 
by YHULI\LQJLIWKHSUREDELOLW\WRREVHUYHFKRLFHV beliefs are more likely to happen:  
  in the compulsory encounter treatment for players who declare or who do not declare 
level of generalized trust higher than the median with respect to the baseline treatment; 
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13 7KHTXHVWLRQZKLFKPHDVXUHVWKHOHYHORIJHQHUDOL]HGWUXVWLVWKHXVXDORQH³*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJGR\RXEHOLHYH
WKDWRWKHUVVKRXOGEHWUXVWHG"´$QVZHUVUDQJHLVfrom 10 (highest level of trust) to 0. 
14 Notice that, without considering generalized trust, there is no a significant difference between the percentage of 
players who chose a number higher than their belief minus 1 in the three treatments. As a whole, 63% of players 
declared  a  number  higher  than  belief-1.  Both  in  the  baseline  and  in  the  compulsory  encounter  treatment  this 
percentage is 65%. In the voluntary encounter treatment it is 62% (the percentage increases to 64% among players 
who choose to meet the counterpart.    in the voluntary encounter treatment for players who opt for the meeting and who declare 
or who do not declare level of generalized trust higher than the median with respect to the 
baseline treatment. 
Since the difference is statistically significant only for players who opt for the meeting in the 
Voluntary Encounter Treatment and who, at the same time, declare high level of generalized 
trust, B2009 conclude that the explanation based on the idea of relational goods seems to be 
appropriate  to  account  for  the  non  standard  behavior  emerging  in  their  TraveOHU¶V 'LOHPPD
experiment.  Moreover,  since  the  mere  reduction  of  social  distance  due  to  the  removal  of 
anonymity after the experiment do not generate effect (in the Compulsory Encounter Treatment 
or in the Voluntary Encounter Treatment for players who do not have high level of generalized 
trust)  on  players  behavior  in  terms  of  willingness  to  reduce  opportunistic  behavior,  authors 
conclude that the usual explanation connected with  the reduction of social  distance (i.e. the 
promotion  of  empathy  among  subjects  and  the  possibility  of  emergence  of  social  norm  of 
cooperation or fairness) do not seem to be effective in this case.
15 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Two recent papers contributed to the literature on the effects of the manipulation of social 
distance  by  making  its  reduction  a  voluntary  choice  of  players.  This  original  element  was 
LQWURGXFHGERWKLQDQ,QYHVWPHQW*DPH%HFFKHWWLHWDODQGLQD7UDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPD
(Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo 2009) by giving players the opportunity to declare if they 
want to meet the counterpart at the end of the experiment. 
The present paper aimed at summarizing the main results of these two contributions in the 
conviction that they take a significant step forward in the behavioral literature by creating for the 
first time an experimental design in order to study the effect relational goods on cooperation. In 
particular, a result which also opens interesting insights for further research has been considered 
in this paper: the willingness to consume relational goods with another player (i.e. the desire to 
share  a  pleasure  time  with  her/him)  increase  the  probability  to  observe  cooperative  or  non-
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15 $WDWKHRUHWLFDOOHYHOWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRFRQVXPHUHODWLRQDOJRRGVFRXOGDIIHFWSOD\HUV¶EHKDYLRUZLWKKLJKOHYHORI
generalized trust also in the CET. However, this effect, which does not arise in the game, may be excluded for a 
simple reason connected  with the characteristic of the production of relational  goods. In fact, the literature on 
relational goods stresses that, even though relational goods may be generated through meetings which happen in 
different environments, some circumstances seem more convenient than others (section 2). In particular, relations 
that are constrained (such as the meeting in the CET) are less likely to generate relational goods (Prouteau and 
Wolff, 2004). For this reason, we may assume that players in the CET may WKLQNWKDWWKH³IRUFHG´HQFRXQWHUDIWHU
the game is not a good occasion to generate relational goods. This interpretation is confirmed by experimental data. opportunistic behavior among players involved in economic interactions even though it entails a 
monetary risk or a sure material sacrifice. In this paper, we showed that:  
  Trustors who opt for meeting the counterpart are more likely to depart from individual 
rationality  (i.e. to  send  positive amount to  the Trustees)  and send on  average higher 
amount than Trustors who do not opt for the meeting; 
  The  amount  sent  back  by  Trustees  and  the  number  of  Trustees  who  do  not  behave 
according to the standard economic behavior (i.e. who do not send back anything) is 
significantly higher when the option of the meeting is selected; 
  In the TUDYHOHU¶V'LOHPPD, agents who voluntarily decide to meet the counterpart (and 
who trust others) are more likely to have a choice which is higher or equal than their 
belief (in this way trying to avoid that a sanction against the other player arises). 
We  showed  that  these  results  may  be  interpreted  as  the  willingness  to  positively  affect 
(through decisions in the game) the disposition of the other players in preparation for the meeting 
which is a crucial factor to create and consume relational goods during the encounter.  
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